Comparison of neighborhood trust between generations in a racially homogeneous society: A case study from Japan. by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Comparison of neighborhood trust
between generations in a racially
homogeneous society: A case study from
Japan.
Eiji Yamamura
3. July 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10218/
MPRA Paper No. 10218, posted 30. August 2008 09:26 UTC
1 
 
Comparison of neighborhood trust between generations 
in a racially homogeneous society: A case study from 
Japan. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Using Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 and 1996, I explore 
the extent to which inequality, age heterogeneity, and human capital have an effect 
upon neighborhood trust, which is ordinarily considered as a kind of particularized 
trust.  The major findings are as follows: (1) Income inequality is associated with low 
trust for both young and the old generations. (2) Age homogeneity and education have a 
detrimental effect on trust. However, this tendency is not observed when the sample 
includes older-generation respondents only.  These results are not changed when I 
instrument for inequality and per capita income using the relative size of the 
mature-aged cohort and the occurrence of natural disasters. It follows that 
neighborhood trust contains mixed features of generalized and particularized trust. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Knack & Keefer (1997), a growing number of 
researchers have explored how and the extent to which interpersonal trust plays an 
important role in economic outcomes such as economic growth (e.g., Knack, 1997; 
Whiteley 2000; Zak & Knack, 2002; Beugelsdijk et al, 2004), tax compliance (Lassen, 
2007), and loan repayment (Cassar, 2007) 1. It seems appropriate that there is also a 
reverse causality, whereby socio-economic condition determines interpersonal trust.   
Thus, researchers have applied themselves to investigations of the determinants of 
trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 
2006 a, 2006b; Chan 2007).   
Previous work has mainly shed light on the influence of racial heterogeneity and 
economic inequality on trust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 
2006b; Gustavsson & Jordahl 2008.).  It has been found that there is a negative 
relationship between trust and ethic and income heterogeneity2.  This might be partly 
because racial heterogeneity is a strong factor in the countries studied, such as the 
United States (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002) and Australia (Leigh, 2006b)3.  Vigdor 
(2004) examined the effect not only of race and economics, but also of age and 
socio-economic heterogeneity on collective action.  These factors are also likely to be 
critical, especially in a racially homogeneous society, so the effect of age heterogeneity 
should be analyzed4 and compared with income and racial heterogeneities.  Besides 
various heterogeneities, there are other important factors influencing trust.  Education, 
which can be considered as human capital, is found to increase generalized trust 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002).   It is reasonable to argue that social capital is positively 
associated with interpersonal trust (Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama, 1995).    
Interpersonal trust can be roughly divided into generalized and particularized 
trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006).  Generalized trust and neighborhood trust are 
ordinarily regarded as particularized trusts thought to play a critical role in 
                                                   
1 In an attempt to bridge the psychological facet and economic ones, there has recently 
been increasing interest in the association between trust and subjective life satisfaction 
(Bjørnskov 2003; Helliwell 2003; 2006; Kingdom and Knight 2007; Uslaner 2002).  
Trust can also be explored from interpersonal relationships and from relationships 
between media and governance (Connolly and Hargreaves Heap 2007). 
2 As for economic inequality, in contrast to the United States, Leigh (2006b) found no 
apparent link between trust and inequality across Australia. 
3 Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) studied participation behavior in heterogeneous 
communities.   
4 Leigh (2006b) examined the effect linguistic heterogeneity on trust and found trust is 
lower in a linguistically heterogeneous community.  
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improvements in economic efficiency (Hayami, 2001).  Even if this is the case, the 
effects of factors like those above on neighborhood trust are likely to differ from those of 
generalized trust since features of neighborhood trust are in part contrasting to those of 
generalized trust.  Little is known, though, about the determinants of neighborhood 
trust; thus the question of how neighborhood trust is formed needs to be examined, and 
its determinants compared with those of generalized trust found in the earlier reports. 
As the degree of trust and its causes might depend on the cultural background of 
the society, cross cultural studies are called for.  Recently, case studies concerning trust 
have been compiled (Barr, 2003; Carpenter et al., 2004; Danielson & Holm, 2007; 
Schechter, L. 2007) and international comparative studies conducted (e.g., Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Buchan & Crosson, 2004; Holm & Danielson, 
2005).  The key determinants of trust appear to vary between different age groups and 
across different periods, even when the same country is considered.  This might be 
partly because of the situations in which individuals confront changes over time alter as 
they become older.  Further, economic development appears to influence lifestyles and 
interpersonal relationships.  Nevertheless, the existing literature does not pay 
sufficient attention to such an effect.  Survey data on Japan, conducted in 1979 and 
1996, respectively cover trust across five age groups.  This data therefore allows me to 
control for the conditions in different periods and to compare the determinants of trust 
between different age groups.  Accordingly, this paper aims to consider both 
socio-economic factors and differences among generations to ascertain the determinants 
of neighborhood trust in a racially homogeneous society.  The results of estimations 
made it evident that income inequality is negatively associated with neighborhood trust 
in both young and old generations, although the effect of inequality is stronger for the 
young generation than for the older. On the other hand, age homogeneity and education 
lead to decreased neighborhood trust for the young generation but not for the old5.  
This implies that determinants of neighborhood trust partly differ from generalized 
trust. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Features of Japanese society 
and changes in interpersonal trust are briefly reviewed in Section 2.   Section 3 
explains the data and method used.  Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations.  
The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Overview of features of Japanese society 
                                                   
5 In this paper, generations are divided into the young generation, under 45 years old, 
and the old generation, over 46 years old. 
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2.1.   Homogeneity and community mechanism 
It is generally believed that Japan is a racially homogeneous society (Index 
Corporation, 2006)6 and that it was in a country group with the lowest inequality 
(Tachibanaki, 2005: Chapter 1).  Under the assumption that people have a greater 
tendency to trust each other in a more homogeneous society (e.g., Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006), this characteristic of Japan leads me to 
the conjecture that the degree of trust in Japanese society is high.   As argued by 
Hayami (2001), “The psychological basis of mutual trust could further be strengthened 
by incorporating personal elements in business transactions, such as the exchange of 
gifts and attendances at weddings and funerals” (Hayami 2001, 290). Accordingly, 
Japanese society is characterized not only by racial and economic homogeneity but also 
by tightly-knit communities, resulting in generating interdependent trust.  Hence, 
when it comes to Japanese society, a high degree of trust appears limited to tightly-knit 
communities or business groups.  
In the literature (Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006), trust has been categorized into 
generalized and particularized kinds of trust 7 .  “The central idea distinguishing 
generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is.” 
(Uslaner, 2002: 26-27).  People with generalized trust have positive views toward both 
their own in-group and of out-groups, whereas those with particularized trust have 
positive views of their own in-group but a negative attitude toward groups to which they 
do not belong 8 .  That is, generalized trust can be extended to strangers while 
particularized trust might be restricted to within a well-established personal network.   
The social network can be considered as the alternative to the market for exchanges 
between a seller and a buyer (Kranton & Minehart, 2001).  It is also thought to 
increase the economic benefit by enhancement of trade (Ranch, 2001; Casella & Rauch, 
2002; Ranch & Trindade, 2002) and by fostering the manufacture-supplier relationship 
(Asanuma, 1989).  People make efforts to enter or continue to be connected to informal 
social networks from which they expect to receive great returns (Hayami, 2001).   
Under the condition that a network is less open, the higher the cost of entry into that 
network becomes for a stranger (Annen, 2001).  If so, open social networks are more 
                                                   
6 The component ratio of Japanese in the 1996 population was 99 % and suggests that 
Japan can be considered as a racially homogeneous society (Index Corporation, 2006). 
7 Banfield (1958) provided a similar argument based on the case of a Southern Italian 
Village. 
8 Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994) defined what I called the particularized trust as 
“mutual assistance”.  Japanese society characterized by preferential treatments given 
to in-group members provides mutual assurance in closed and tightly-knit relationships 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
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likely to be formed in a society with generalized trust than in one with particularized 
trust.  Generalized trust thus has an economic benefit, for instance, through formation 
and expansion of networks.  Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) found that Americans 
have a higher level of generalized trust than Japanese9.  This leads me to predict that 
the Japanese economy will be impeded by the structure of trust in Japan.    
However, particularized trust also seems to have a positive effect on economic 
development under some socio-economic conditions.  Taking the example of Japan, it 
has been pointed out that “long-term continuous transactions between a main bank and 
an in-group of borrowers increases information and reduces the cost of monitoring 
credits, while a community relationship of trust and cooperation is effective in reducing 
moral hazards for borrowers” (Hayami, 2001: 326).   
Nevertheless, the role of community trust, as above, does not continue to be stable 
because of the changes in circumstance in modern society.  Yamamura (2005), based 
upon the case of a Japan garment cluster, found that interpersonal trust within a 
community improved a firm‟s performance in the developing stage of the cluster 
whereas it deteriorated its performance in the developed stage, This suggested that the 
role played by community-based trust in economic performance changes over time.  
There is an argument that neighborhood trust, which seems equivalent to community 
trust, has a mixture of generalized and particularized trust since “some neighbors we 
know well, others we don‟t. So trusting neighbors is a mixture of faith in both friends 
(slightly higher weighting) and strangers (slightly lower).” (Uslaner, 2002: p.53).   If 
the number of immigrants increases and then come to cooperate with the original 
community members, community-based trust can be categorized into generalized trust.   
It might be possible that interpersonal trust within a community becomes open to 
strangers in response to a transition in socio-economic conditions10.  That is to say, the 
characteristics of community based trust can evolve to adapt to changes in community 
surroundings.  Thus it is interesting to examine the question of how community-based 
trust is formed and if the determinants of community-based trust are different from 
those for generalized trust in modern society.  
 
 Changes of neighborhood trust  
                                                   
9 According the World Values Survey, the generalized trust ratio for USA of 41.5 % is 
about 1.4 % lower than Japan‟s. Data is available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
The World Values Survey is organized through a network of social scientists coordinated 
by the World Values Survey Association. The World Value Survey has been widely used 
in previous research (e.g., Bjørnskov 2006, Chan 2007). 
10 Chan (2007) found a positive relationship between openness-generalized trust under 
pressure of globalization.  
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Surveys in 1979 and 1996, carried out by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(Nihon Hoso Kyokai), asked respondents, “Are there many persons whom you can trust 
in your neighborhood?”.  I use this Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979, 1996) data 
at the prefecture level., The rate of respondents who said “yes” was separately reported 
for five generations, 16-25 years old, 26-35 years old, 36-45 years old, 46-55 years old, 
and over 56 years old.  This rate is used as the measure of trust.   
It seems appropriate that the degree of trust differs among age groups not only 
because the experience of life changes interpersonal relationships, but also because 
individuals‟ economic circumstances change as time passes.  
Table 1 presents the degree of average neighborhood trust across generations in 
1979 and 1996, separately.  I see from Table 1 that individuals are more likely to trust 
neighbors as they become older.11 As well, the degree of trust in 1979 is higher than in 
1996, which is in line with the United States, where generational decline in generalized 
trust between 1970s and 1990s was reported (Putnam, 2000: Chapter 8)12.  The decline 
of neighborhood trust presumably reflects the change of the community in which 
neighborhood trust was shaped.  When I use samples of all generations, the rates are 
47 % and 44 % in 1979 and 1996, respectively.  This is almost the same as the 
generalized trust value for Japan of 42.9 % taken from the World Value Survey.  This 
supports the assumption, as previously discussed, that neighborhood trust shares the 
characteristics not only of particularized trust but also of generalized trust (Uslaner, 
2002).  
 For simplicity, in this paper, generations are divided into a young generation, 
between 16-45 years of age, and an old generation, older than 46 years of age.  Table 2 
(1) showing a comparison of young and old generations in each period reveals that the 
degree of trust in the young generation is lower than the old one and hardly changes 
from 1979 to 1996.  On the other hand, for the old generation, the fact that the degree 
of trust in 1996 is significantly (6 %) lower than that of 1979, indicates a substantial 
decline of trust. This implies that the degree of connection between the older generation 
and the community weakened.  The difference of trust between urban and other 
regions is set out in Table 2(2)13.  The degrees of trust in other regions are consistently 
                                                   
11 Older people are generally more trusting (Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2000). 
12 The index of trust used in Putnam (2000) is the percent of who say “most people can 
be trusted”.   
13 The urban region consists of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Osaka, Kanawa, Aichi, and Hyogo.  
Tokyo is the most urbanized prefecture followed by Osaka.  Kanagawa, Aichi, and 
Hyogo include and the well known large cities of Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe, 
respectively. 
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higher than for the urban regions.  However, I found a significant decrease in other 
regions between 1979 and 1996, but not in urban regions.  It follows from Table 2(1) 
and 2(2) that the gap between generations and regions has narrowed as time has 
passed. 
Table 3 (1) and (2) presents comparisons between urban and other regions by 
generation and period.  From Table 3 (1), I find that there is a significant difference 
between regions for the young generation but not the old.  In Table 3(2), I find a 
significant difference between regions in 1979 but not in 1996.  Considering Table 2 
and Table 3 together, the gap of trust disappears as time has passed and people become 
older.  More precisely, community connections in non-urban regions become weaker, 
becoming similar to those in urban areas.  If a community becomes more open to 
strangers in exchange for closely-knit community ties becoming weaker, neighborhood 
trust comes to have features of generalized trust. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data and socio-economic conditions 
    The data set used in this study is a survey panel of 47 prefectures covering 15 years 
from 1988 to 2002.  As earlier noted, the trust data used here was drawn from the 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation surveys of 1979 and 1996.  Table 4 includes variable 
definitions and means for the data analyzed from 1979 and 1996.  Variables are 
discussed later.  The population of each generation, numbers for per capita incomes, 
numbers of firefighting teams and members are derived from Index Publishing (2006). 
The Gini coefficients of income in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 are from the Statistics 
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications14.  The human capital 
index is taken from the Hi-Stat data base15.  Other variables are from Asahi Shimbun 
(2004).   
I proceed to discuss socio-economic changes of Japan as presented in Table 4.  As 
researchers have pointed out, the situation for Japan has recently changed; for instance, 
income inequality in Japan has increased (Tachibanaki, 2005: 6-9). Compared with 1979, 
GINI is significantly augmented in 1996.  As well, although the ratio of non-Japanese 
                                                   
14 Gini data at the prefecture level can be obtained every five years.  Therefore, to 
construct the panel data, additional data used for the estimations were generated by 
interpolations based on an assumption of constant changing rates.  
15 Data is available at 
http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/pfactor.xls. This 
prefecture-level panel data base was constructed by Fukao and Yue (2000).  
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remains less than 1 %, it did significantly increase from 0.39 % to 0.66 % between those 
years.  These increases of income and racial heterogeneity are thought to be related to 
the decline of neighborhood trust, as discussed in the previous subsection.  By contrast 
with income and racial heterogeneity, age heterogeneity falls just slightly.  
Furthermore, to ascertain the age structure in more detail, the ratios for each 
generation are presented.  It is clearly observable that the young generation ratios, 
such as GEN1524, GEN2534, and GEN3544, decreased whereas the older generation 
ones, GEN4554, and GEN55, increased, implying demographic shifts.  It is especially 
striking that GEN55 rose by over 11%, reflecting the fact that Japan is moving towards 
an aged society.   
HC, the human capital index, increases significantly, indicating that more human 
capital was accumulated in 1996 than in 1979.  It is observed in the development 
process of a garment cluster located in a rural region, that school education became 
more important than community-based trust when the production base was relocated to 
outside the cluster (Yamamura, 2005).  The fact that trust decreases, as shown 
previously, and that human capital become greater is in line with the above case study.  
Modern Japanese society is rooted in the group responsibility system within a 
community.  For instance, community firefighting teams originated in the Edo period 
and continue to exist (Goto 2001).  Community firefighting teams, informal 
institutions, are called for nowadays because of the scarcity of public firehouses, and are 
regarded as formal institutions; hence they are a substitute for public firehouses.  
What is more, such a team plays an important role in deterring the incidence of fires 
and also in generating social capital through interpersonal communication in 
cooperative protective activities against disasters (Goto 2001).  FFTM and FFME, the 
number of fire fighting teams and its members, are thus considered as proxies for social 
capital.  They are stable between 1979 and 1996. 
MOBIN and MOBIM are the number of those changing residence within a 
prefecture and immigrants from another prefecture.  I include them to capture, to 
some extent, the number of strangers present within a community.  POP and INCOM 
are included for the economic condition.  Total income level was significantly 
augmented, from 43.8 to 50.5 trillion yen; reflecting the economic growth seen in Japan 
during that period.   
 
3.2.  Method 
 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust then takes the 
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following form: 
Ln(TRUST) its= 0 + 1 Ln(GINI it + 2Ln(ETFRA)it + 3Ln(AGEFRA)it + 
4Ln(GENSAM)its +5Ln(HC)it + 6Ln(FFTM)it + 7Ln(FFME)it + 
+8Ln(MOBIN)it-+9Ln(MOBIM)it +10Ln(POP)it +11Ln(INCOM)it  
+εi+νt +λs+ωits , 
 
where TRUST represents the rate of trust in prefecture i in year t, and generation s.  
‟s represents the regression parameters. εi,νt andλs represent the unobservable 
specific effects of the individual effects of i „s prefecture (a fixed effect prefecture vector ) 
in year t (a fixed effect time vector) and generation s (a fixed effect generation vector ), 
respectively; ωit represents the error term.   
As earlier mentioned, the structure of the data set is a panel covering two years 
and 47 prefectures;εi holds the time invariant feature, for which I control by means of 
fixed effects estimation.  Macroeconomic conditions are captured in ν t, and I 
incorporate each year‟s dummy variables to restrain the time specific effects.  
Generations dummies are included to capture the generation effectsλs as follows. 
Y1524, Y2534, Y3544, and Y4554 stand for the 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54 
generations, respectively.  The dependent variable and all independent variables, with 
the exception of dummy variables, take log forms.  Therefore, their coefficient, , 
means the elasticity, which allows me to directly compare the degree of impact of each 
variable.   Furthermore, it should be emphasized that it is necessary to deal with the 
endogenous problem, which has been recently stressed in research (e.g., Leigh 2006a; 
Bjørnskov 2006; Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008).  With aim of alleviating potential 
endogenous problems with the Gini coefficient and per capita income, 2SLS estimation 
was performed.  
     The effects of each variable on trust are discussed.  Yamagishi et al (1998) argued 
that social uncertainty stemming from, for instance asymmetric information in the 
market, tends to encourage stable relationships with specific partners.  A 
heterogeneous society where people have different characteristics is expected to 
increase social uncertainty and therefore strengthen closed and stable relationships.  
It is reasonably assumed that closed and stable relationships generate particularized 
trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). If this is the case, social heterogeneity is 
positively associated with particularized trust.  Assuming that neighborhood trust is 
regarded as particularized trust, the coefficients of the proxy for heterogeneity are 
predicted to take the positive sign.  On the other hand, the sign of GINI 16 ETFRA and 
                                                   
16 Gini data at the prefecture level is obtained five years, though data for 1996 are not 
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AGEFRA 17 will be negative if income, social and age heterogeneity result in the 
lowering of trust as found in reports that have investigated generalized trust.  A 
cursory examination of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that income inequality and racial 
heterogeneity are negatively associated with neighborhood trust; supporting the latter 
presumption that neighborhood trust has features of generalized trust.  Nevertheless, 
as shown in Figure 3, age heterogeneity seems unrelated to trust.  
    Age heterogeneity differs from other kinds of heterogeneity in that people belonging 
to the same generation are likely to become competitors in various situations. For 
instance, during school age, there are entrance examinations for high school and 
university18 . Even after graduation, severe competition for high positions occurs.  
Hence, people are less likely to cooperate with their own generation if the hostility 
coming from competitive pressure outweighs the familiarity stemming from 
generational homogeneity, leading to generational members distrusting each other.  
Necessarily, to capture such an effect, adding a proxy for age heterogeneity, I 
incorporate GENSAM, which stands for the ratio of the same generation population for 
the corresponding generation sample.  That is to say, for instance, the value of 
GENSAM is the ratio of the 15-24 years old population in each prefecture and in each 
year when the dependent variable is the trust ratio of Y15-24 in the corresponding 
prefecture and year.  The anticipated sign of GENSAM would be negative. 
From previous reports (Zak & Knack 2001; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002), HC will 
be positively correlated with trust and take a positive sign.  The more educated people 
are, the more they are inclined to work and trust each other than to spend time 
verifying each others‟ actions because the opportunity cost for them is high (Zak and 
Knack, 2001).  Nevertheless, with respect to neighborhood trust, this seems to be 
formed through long-term and frequent interactions with neighbors.  Time spent in 
such a community-based and closed relationship is considered to be an opportunity cost.  
It becomes relatively higher for more educated people.  Better-educated people can 
access information concerning business opportunities outside of their community 
                                                                                                                                                     
available.  Therefore, I use the 1994 data.   
17 Because of the lack of data, the ratio of non-Japanese is used as a proxy for ethnic 
fractionalization.  Following the general index of fractionalization (Alesina and La 
Ferra, 2002), age fractionalization can be written as 
 


N
i
iAGFRAC
1
21   
where i  is the proportion of people who belong to the age group i , and N is the 
number of groups. 
18 It is well known that entrance examinations in Japan are very competitive, at least 
through the 1990s.   
11 
 
network, and thus increase their benefits.  Inevitably, better-educated people are less 
apt to get along with community members, resulting in lower neighborhood trust.   As 
a consequence, the sign of HC is predicted to become negative.     
 People are more likely to trust each other if there is a place where they can 
communicate with each other and if the community is well-organized.  As discussed in 
the previous subsection, FFTM and FFME can be considered as proxies for social capital.    
Hence, it is possible that the coefficients of FFTM and FFME would take positive signs.  
MOBIN and MOBIM are thought to capture the influence of strangers.  If their signs 
become negative, neighborhood trust is characterized by the tendency that people do not 
believe strangers, and so are categorized into particularized trust.  In the case that the 
signs of MOBIN and MOBIM coefficients are not stable, strangers do not influence 
neighborhood trust, implying that neighborhood trust has features of generalized trust.  
POP and INCOM, representing population and per capita income, respectively, are the 
control variables used to capture economic conditions.  It is reasonably assumed that 
larger prefectures are more diverse, which controls for the heterogeneity that cannot be 
captured by heterogeneity variables as above (Bjørnskov 2006).  
 
4. Results 
4.1.   Fixed Effects model. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the fixed effects estimations made in this study.  In 
Table 6, the results of the fixed effects 2SLS estimations are reported; where, following 
Leigh (2006a), the sizes of the mature-age cohorts are used as instruments for GINI and 
INCOM19.  As well as cohorts, I also use the number of disasters as an instrument 
since it is plausibly hypothesized that an external shock has a tremendous effect on 
levels of income.  In particular, poor people who live in fragile houses might suffer more 
seriously from a disaster, leading to an increase in income inequality.  The results for 
all samples are shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, and columns (1)-(4) of Table 6.   
Those for the young generation are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, and 
columns (5)-(8) of Table 6, respectively.  Those for the older generation samples are in 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 5, and columns (9)-(12) of Table 6.    
All coefficients of GINI take negative signs although the results for the older 
generations, as reported in columns (5) and (6), are not statistically significant.  This 
                                                   
19 I use the following as instrument variables: (1) a logarithm of the population aged 
20-59, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59.  (2) a logarithm of the number of disasters.  
These have been collected from Index Publishing (2006). 
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does not support the expectation that economic inequality increases trust under the 
assumption that neighborhood trust is particularized trust.  But this is consistent 
with the results provided in reports that have examined generalized trust.  It follows 
from the result of inequality that neighborhood trust has features of generalized trust.  
Furthermore, the absolute values for the young generation are 6 times larger than 
those for the older one.  These results tell me that income inequality has a far larger 
negative effect on neighborhood trust for the young generation than for the old.   
 Signs of ETFRA become positive in all columns, which is consistent with the 
prediction that heterogeneity is positively associated with trust.  With respect to 
AGEFRA, signs are found to be positive for all samples and the young generation, but 
negative for the old generation; implying that age heterogeneity has different effects on 
young and old generations.  Looking at the fourth row of columns (2) reveals that 
GENSAM has a negative influence on trust.  In the case that samples are divided into 
young and old generations, it is interesting to observe that negative and positive 
coefficient signs are reported in columns (4) and (6), respectively.  This tells me that 
trust is a decreasing function of GENSAM for the young generation but an increasing 
function of GENSAM for the old one.  My interpretation of the results of AGEFRA and 
GENSAM is as follows.  As generally anticipated, the larger the size of a generation, 
the larger the number of rivals within it.  People are, in general, more likely to become 
rivals to each other in various situations if they belong to the same generation, resulting 
in a reduction in trust between them.  Nevertheless, this seems inappropriate for the 
older generation since the likelihood is that people‟s conduct changes as the effects of 
competition decrease.  That is, it seems that income level and position for the older 
generation is more stable than for the younger one, which leads to a decrease in 
competitive pressure within the older generation.  Once people within the same 
generation are not rivals, they become more familiar with each other than before 
because they share the same generational characteristics.    
The significant negative signs of HC in columns (1) and (2) tell me that education 
has a negative effect on neighborhood trust, as previously anticipated.  Furthermore, it 
is surprising to observe that the absolute values are about 3.8, showing that 
neighborhood trust decreases 3.8 % when HC increases by 1 %. Compared with the 
results of other variables, where absolute values are less than 1.00, I found the effect of 
HC remarkably large.  For a closer examination, I examine the results for the younger 
and older generations.  Looking at columns (3) and (4) reveals that its signs continue to 
be significantly negative and that its absolute values become larger than 5.  By 
contrast with the young generation, the signs for the old generation are negative in 
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column (5) but positive in column (6), but are statistically insignificant.  As well, the 
absolute values of HC sharply decrease and become less than 1.  From what is 
observed in the results of HC, I derive that the negative effect of education on 
neighborhood trust holds for the younger generation but not for the older one.  I 
interpret this as suggesting that the younger generation is more competitive than the 
old and hence the incentive to search for profitable opportunities increases, leading to a 
decrease in the time available to get along with other community members.  As a 
consequence, educated younger generation members are less inclined to trust neighbors 
than those in the older generation.  This is consistent with the results of GENSAM. 
In all estimations, the coefficient of FFTM becomes the predicted positive, whereas 
FFME are unexpectedly negative, which implies that the effect of social capital is 
ambiguous.  MOBIN takes a negative sign while the signs of MOBIM are not stable.  
Furthermore, their absolute values are mostly smaller than 0.10 so that neighborhood 
trust is relatively inelastic with respect to strangers.   The negative signs of POP in 
columns (1) and (2) are congruent with the expectation, despite being statistically 
insignificant.  This continues to be hold for the younger generation but not for the older 
one.  
 As for the generation dummies such as Y1524, Y2534, Y3544, and Y4554, the 
default for generation dummies is the generation over 55 years old in columns (1),(2), (5), 
and (6).  When it comes to columns (3) and (4), the default is Y3544.    All signs are 
significantly negative and absolute values almost become larger if the generations 
become younger.  This tells me that, compared with the older generation, members of 
the younger generation are less apt to trust neighbors, which is consistent with previous 
reports.  
 
4.2.   Fixed Effects 2SLS model. 
 
Before turning to consider each variable‟s coefficients, I begin by checking the 
validity of the instrumental variable method.  In odd numbered columns, only GINI is 
instrumented, while in even numbered columns, both GINI and INCOM are 
instrumented.  As shown in the second and third rows from the bottom, all 
F-statistics are larger than 30.  What is more, an over-identification test is used to 
check the exogeneity of instruments.  As reported in the third row from the bottom, 
the results of the over-identification test indicate that exogeneity is a valid assumption 
in all estimations.  Overall, the choice of instruments is valid in all estimations and 
thus the Fixed Effects 2SLS estimation is applicable.  
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As is reported in Table 6, the signs of GINI remain the same as in Table 5 when not 
only unobservable individual fixed effects but also endogeneity bias are controlled for.  
With respect to magnitude, absolute values are mostly over 2 and thus become about 4 
times larger than those shown in Table 5; telling me that neighborhood trust becomes 
more elastic with respect to income inequality after controlling for endogeneity.  This 
result is similar to that suggested in Bjørnskov (2006).   Furthermore, the influence of 
GINI for the young generation continues to be larger than for the old when Fixed Effects 
2SLS is employed.   
ETFRA and AGEFRA in general affect negatively on neighborhood trust, as 
reflected by their negative signs in columns (1)-(4), with the exception of AGEFRA in 
columns (3) and (4), though statistically insignificant. This is the reverse of what is 
observed in Table 5, implying that the influences of various types of heterogeneity on 
neighborhood trust are generally equivalent to those of generalized trust as seen in 
earlier studies (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 2006b; Gustavsson 
& Jordahl 2008).  When I divide the sample into young and old generations, most signs 
become positive in the young but negative in the old.   These results lead me to 
presume that neighborhood trust can be categorized as particularized trust for the 
younger generation but generalized trust for the older.  In my interpretation, features 
of neighborhood trust appear to depend on the generation‟s perception, which, however, 
requires special attention and is thus open for discussion.  I obtained similar results 
for GENSAM as those in Table 5, indicating its robustness for alternative estimations 
and specifications. 
Signs of HC remain the same as in Table 5.  However, their absolute values 
become distinctly larger than those of Table 5 after controlling for endogeneity.   
Results for the rest of the variables are the same as in Table 5.   
In most case, signs of MOBIN and MOBIM are negative and positive, respectively, 
and their values are smaller than 0.10.  They are not statistically significant, which is 
in line with the results in Table 5.  The fact that strangers do not affect neighborhood 
trust might indicate that neighborhood trust can be partly characterized as 
generalized trust.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Neighborhood trust is thought to play an important role in lowering transaction 
costs and raising economic performance within a community.  Such a positive effect of 
trust appears important, especially in the early stage of the development process.  
However, little is reported about how neighborhood trust is formed, although some 
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researchers have attempted to explore generalized trust.  Neighborhood trust might 
ordinarily be considered as particularized trust.  A community where neighborhood 
trust is formed, however, might alter under the influence of changes in socio-economic 
circumstances.  In conjunction with this, neighborhood trust would also change and 
become characterized by both particularized and generalized trust.   This research 
aimed to ascertain the determinants of neighborhood trust and investigate its features 
in Japan, where neighborhood trust is thought to play a crucial role in improving 
economic performance.  To this end, using prefecture level data of Japan for the years 
1979 and 1996, I explored the extent to which inequality, age heterogeneity, and human 
capital have effects on neighborhood trust.  Using Fixed Effects 2SLS allowed me to 
control for unobservable fixed effects and endogeneity.   
The major findings are as follows:  Consistent with earlier reports that have 
examined generalized trust, income inequality is associated with low trust for both 
young and old generations, although its magnitude is smaller for the old.  It is also 
interesting to observe that strangers hardly affect neighborhood trust.  Age 
homogeneity and education are associated with low trust; this tendency is, however, not 
observed when the sample includes only old generation respondents.  These results 
were not changed when I instrumented for inequality and per capita income using the 
relative size of the mature-aged cohort.  
Findings as above clarify that neighborhood trust is a mixture of generalized and 
particularized trust.  Income inequality effects on neighborhood trust are equivalent to 
those for generalized trust, as previously reported (Gustavsson & Jordahl 2008).  
Features of generalized trust are also reflected in the fact that strangers do not 
influence trust.  On the other hand, influences of age homogeneity and human capital 
on neighborhood trust are not consistent with those on generalized trust.  Furthermore, 
their impacts are in part affected by the feature of the generations.  From what is 
presented here, it is plausible to argue that features of neighborhood trust are under the 
influence of changes in circumstances and so evolve over time.  Even if, as generally 
believed, a community is closed to strangers, it is induced to open up and adjusted to the 
modern socio-economic environment under pressure of nation-wide or global economic 
integration. 
Evidence provided in this research has been deduced from aggregated 
prefecture-level data.  Limitations inherent in the data do not allow me to more closely 
explore how and the extent to which heterogeneity and human capital have an influence 
on neighborhood trust.  What is more, it is unclear that features of a neighborhood are 
altered to adjust to changes in conditions such as those involving economic integration. 
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Hence, it will be necessary to more carefully scrutinize features of neighborhood trust.  
Thus, further research, using disaggregated individual data, including information 
about the level of trust, sex, age, education and income, is required.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
References 
 
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 847-904. 
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trust others? Journal of Public Economics, 85, 
207-234. 
Annen, K. (2001). Inclusive and exclusive social capital in the small-firm sector in 
developing countries. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
157, 319-330. 
Asahi Shimbun. (2004). Minryoku: TODOFUKEN-BETSU MINRYOKU SOKUTEI 
SHIRYOSHU (CD-ROM edition), Asahi-Newspaper, Tokyo. 
Asanuma, B. (1989). Manufacture-supplier relationships in Japan and the concept of 
relation specific skill. Journal of Japanese & International Economics, 3, 
1-30. 
Baltagi, B. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley and Sons, West 
Sussex.  
Bansfield,E.C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society, New York: Free Press.  
Barr, A. (2003). Trust and expected trustworthiness: experimental evidence from 
Zimbabwean villages. Economic Journal, 113, 614-630. 
Beugelsdijk, S., de Groot, H.L.F., & van Schaik. (2004). Trust and economic growth: a 
robustness analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 118-134. 
Berggren, N., & Jordahl, H. (2006). Free to trust: economic freedom and social capital. 
Kyklos, 59, 141-169. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2003). The happy few. Cross country evidence on social capital and life 
satisfaction. Kyklos, 56, 3-16. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison. 
Public Choice, 130, 1-21. 
Buchan, N., & Crosson, R. (2004). The boundaries of trust: Own and other ‟s actions in 
the US and China, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, 
485-504. 
Carpenter, J.P.., Daniere, A.G., & Takahashi, L.M. (2004). Cooperation, trust, and social 
capital in southeast Asian urban slums. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 55, 533-551. 
Casella,A & Rauch, J. E., (2002). Anonymous market and group ties in international 
trade. Journal of International Economics, 58, 19-47. 
18 
 
Cassar, A., Crowley, L., and Wydick, B. (2007). The effect of social capital on group loan 
repayment: Evidence from field experiments. Economic Journal, 117, 
F85-F106. 
Chan, K.S. (2007). Trade, social values, and the generalized trust. Southern Economic 
Journal, 73, 733-753. 
Connolly, S., & Hargreaves Heap, S. (2007). Cross country differences in trust in 
television and the governance of public broadcasters, Kyklos, 60, 3-14. 
Danielson, A.J., & Holm, H.J. (2007). Do you trust your brethren? Eliciting trust 
attitudes and trust behavior in a Tanzanian congregation. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 62, 225-271. 
Fukao, K., & Yue, X. (2000). Regional Factor Inputs and Convergence in Japan: How 
Much Can We Apply Closed Economy Neoclassical Growth Models? (in 
Japanese), Economic Review, 51, 136-151. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: the social virtues and creation of prosperity. London: 
Hamish Hamilton. 
Goto, I. (2001). Tracing the origin of the communal fire-fighting team: Communal 
fire- fighting team in the 21th century (Shobo-dan no Genkryu o 
Tadoru: 21seki no Shobo-dan no Arikata).  Tokyo: 
Kindaishobo-sha. 
Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J.A., & Soutter, C.L. (2000). Measuring Trust. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 811-846. 
Gustavsson, M., & Jordahl, H. (2008). Inequality and trust in Sweden: Some 
inequalities are more harmful than others. Journal of Public 
Economics, 92, 348-365. 
Hayami, Y. (2001). Development economics: From poverty to the wealth of nations. 
(second edition). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Helliwell, J. F. (2003). How‟s life? Combining individual and national variables to 
explain subjective well-being. Economic Modeling, 20, 331-360. 
Helliwell, J. F. (2006). Well-being, social capital and public policy: What‟s new?. 
Economic Journal, 116, C34-C45. 
Holm, J.H., & Danielson, A. (2005). Tropic trust versus Nordic trust: Experimental 
evidence from Tanzania and Sweden. Economic Journal, 115,505-532. 
Index Corporation. (2006). Chiiki toukei 2006 (CD-ROM edition), Index corporation, 
Tokyo. 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation ( Nihon hoso kyokai ), 1979; 1996. Zenkoku kenmin 
ishiki chosa.  
19 
 
Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B., & Lchner, K. (1997). Social capital, income inequality, and 
mortality. American Journal of Public Health, 87, 1491-1498. 
Kingdom, G.G., & Knight, J. (2007). Community, comparisons and subjective well-being 
in a divided society. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64, 69-90. 
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A 
cross-country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116. 
Knack, S. (1997).Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence one the Olson and 
Putnam hypothesis. Public Choice, 117, 341-355. 
Kranton, R., & Minehart, D. (2001). A Theory of buyer-seller networks, American 
Economic Review, 91, 485-508. 
Lassen, D.D. (2007). Ethnic divisions, trust, and the size of the informal sector. Journal 
of economic behavior and organization,63, 423-438. 
Leigh, A. (2006a). Does equality lead to fraternity? Economics letters, 93, 121-125. 
Leigh, A. (2006b). Trust, inequality, and ethnic heterogeneity, Economic Record, 82, 
268-280. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press.  
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, A 
Touchstone Book, New York.  
Rauch, J.E., (2001). Business and Social Networks in International Trade, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 39,1177-1203. 
Rauch,J.E., & Trindade,V. (2002). Ethnic Chinese Networks In International Trade,  
Review of Economics & Statistics, 84,116-130. 
Schechter, L. (2007). Traditional trust measurement and the risk confound: an 
experiment in rural Paraguay. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
62, 271-292. 
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (various 
year). Zenkoku shohi zhittai chosa. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Tachibanaki, T. (2005). Confronting income inequality in Japan: A comparative analysis 
of causes, consequences, reform. MIT Press, London. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
Whiteley, P. (2000). Economic growth and social capital. Political Studies, 48, 443-466. 
Yamagishi, A., Cook, K.S., & Watanabe, M. (1998). Uncertainty, trust, and commitment 
formation in the United States and Japan. American Journal of 
20 
 
Sociology, 104, 165-194. 
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129-166. 
Yamamura, E. (2005). Social capital, human Capital, and the dynamics of learning: The 
case of the development and the transformation garment industry in 
Bingo region (in Japanese).Economic Review, 56, 111-122. 
Vigdor, J.L. (2004). Community composition and collective action: Analyzing initial mail 
response to the 2000 census. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86, 303-312. 
Zak, P.J. & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. Economic Journal, 111, 295-321. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between gini and trust. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between the ratio of non-Japanese and trust. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between age heterogeneity and trust. 
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Table 1.  Neighborhood trust by generation in 1979 and 1996 (%) 
Generation  1979 1996 
16-25   42 
 
39 
26-35 
 
 38 41 
36-45 
  
 45 44 
46-55 
 
51 44 
56- 
 
 59 
 
55 
 
ALL 
 
47 44 
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Table 2.  Comparison of neighborhood trust levels (%) 
  (1)  Comparison between 1979 and 1996 by generation a  
Generation  1979 1996 t-valueb 
26-45   42 
 
 41 0.30 
46- 
 
 55 49 4.62** 
 
  (2)  Comparison between 1979 and 1996 by area c  
Generation  1979 1996 t-valueb 
urban   41 
 
 42 0.24 
others 
 
 48 45 3.02** 
Notes: 
a. Generation 26-45 is aggregated the observations of three generations such as 16-25, 
26-35 and 36-45.  Generation 46- is aggregated the observations of two generations 
such as 46-55 and 56-.   
b. Absolute t-values are presented.  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
c. Urban areas consist of the 5 prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and 
Hyogo.  
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Table 3.  Comparison of neighborhood trust levels(%) 
 
(1)  Comparison between urban and other by generation a, c 
Year  urban other t-valueb 
26-45   44 53 4.35** 
 
45- 
 
 40 
 
42 1.26 
All 
 
 42 
 
 46 3.24** 
 
 (2)  Comparison between urban and other by year  
Year  urban other t-valueb 
1979   41 48 2.97** 
 
1996 
 
 42 
 
45 1.57 
 
Notes: 
a. Generation 26-45 is aggregated the observations of three generations such as 16-25, 
26-35 and 36-45.  Generation 46- is aggregated the observations of two generations 
such as 46-55 and 56-.   
b. Absolute t-values are presented.  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
c. Urban areas consist of the 5 prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and 
Hyogo.  
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Table 4.  Variable definitions and comparison between 1979 and 1996 
 
Variables Definition  1979 1996 t-valueb 
GINI  
 
Gini coefficient of income   0.26 0.29 7.56** 
 
ETFRA 
 
Ratio of non-Japanese in population of 
Japan. (%) 
 0.39 
 
0.66 2.83** 
AGEFRA Herfindahl-type index of age 
heterogeneity 
 0.92 
 
 0.91 10.1** 
GEN1524 
 
Ratio of generation between 15 and 24 
years old. (%) 
 14.6  13.8 3.35** 
GEN2534 
 
Ratio of generation between 25 and 34 
years old. (%) 
 16.4 12.3 10.6** 
GEN3544 
 
Ratio of generation between 35 and 44 
years old. (%) 
 14.5  13.2 10.1** 
GEN4554 
 
Ratio of generation between 45 and 54 
years old. (%) 
 12.4  15.2 11.2** 
GEN55_ 
 
Ratio of generation over 55 years old. 
(%) 
 17.7  29.0 18.1** 
HC 
 
Human capital index 1.02  1.06 8.24** 
FFTM 
 
Number of fire fighting teams 
(thousands). 
 0.63 0.61 0.25 
FFME 
 
Number of fire fighting team members 
(thousands). 
 22.9  20.6 0.91 
MOBIN 
 
Numbers changing residence within 
prefecture (thousands). 
81.4  75.5 0.28 
MOBIM 
 
Number of immigrants from other 
prefectures (thousands) 
 75.9  63.0 0.72 
POP 
 
Number of population (millions).  2.37  2.65 0.59 
INCOM 
 
Regional real income (Trillions of Yen). 
 
 43.8 50.5 7.65** 
Note: Values are simple averages. Data source is from Asahi Shimbun (2004) and Index 
Publishing (2006), and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (various years).   
b. Absolute t-values are presented.  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.  Dependent variable:  rates of respondent trusting neighbors.  
(Fixed effects model) 
 (1)ALL (2)ALL (3)YOUG (4)YOUG (5)OLD (6)OLD 
Ln(GINI) -0.44* 
(-1.83) 
-0.44* 
(-1.85) 
-0.65* 
(-1.94) 
-0.61* 
(-1.84) 
-0.11 
(-0.41) 
-0.08 
(-0.31) 
Ln(ETFRA) 
 
0.03 
(1.39) 
0.03 
(1.45) 
0.05 
(1.40) 
0.05 
(1.37) 
0.01 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
Ln(AGEFRA) 0.68 
(0.18) 
1.46 
(0.40) 
1.36 
(0.26) 
1.91 
(0.37) 
-0.32 
(-0.08) 
-2.84 
(-0.66) 
Ln(GENSAM) 
 
 -0.12** 
(-3.43) 
 -0.38** 
(-3.54) 
 0.19** 
(2.63) 
Ln(HC) 
 
-3.84* 
(-2.25) 
-3.87* 
(-2.30) 
-6.06** 
(-2.52) 
-5.50** 
(-2.34) 
-0.51 
(-0.26) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Ln(FFTM) 
 
0.42* 
(1.79) 
0.42* 
(1.80) 
0.33 
(0.99) 
0.35 
(1.08) 
0.57* 
(2.06) 
0.59* 
(2.20) 
Ln(FFME) 
 
-0.41 
(-1.20) 
-0.45 
(-1.20) 
-0.19 
(-0.40) 
-0.18 
(-0.39) 
-0.73* 
(-1.87) 
-0.75* 
(-1.95) 
Ln(MOBIN) 
 
-0.07 
(-0.49) 
-0.07 
(-0.50) 
-0.06 
(-0.30) 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
-0.09 
(-0.52) 
-0.07 
(-0.43) 
Ln(MOBIM) 
 
0.04 
(0.29) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.14 
(0.73) 
0.15 
(0.84) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.001) 
-0.002 
(-0.01) 
-0.12 
(-0.26) 
-0.08 
(-0.20) 
0.17 
(0.47) 
0.21 
(0.56) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.25 
(1.63) 
0.25 
(1.65) 
0.35 
(1.61) 
0.33 
(1.59) 
0.10 
(0.58) 
0.09 
(0.55) 
Y1524 
 
-0.34** 
(-17.2) 
-0.40** 
(-15.3) 
-0.09** 
(-4.40) 
-0.08** 
(-4.04) 
  
Y2534 
 
-0.37** 
(-18.7) 
-0.43** 
(-16.3) 
-0.12** 
(-5.90) 
-0.12** 
(-5.61) 
  
Y3544 
 
-0.24** 
(12.3) 
-0.30** 
(11.5) 
    
Y4554 
   
-0.18** 
(9.38) 
-0.25** 
(9.30) 
  -0.18** 
(-12.8) 
-0.09** 
(2.42) 
Obs 470 470 282 282 188 188 
Adj. R 2 0.55 0.55 0.20 0.21 0.65 0.65 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors.  
* and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Year dummies 
are included, but not reported in order to save space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6   Dependent variable:  rates of respondent trusting neighbors. (Fixed effects 2sls model) 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Year dummies are included, but not reported in order to save space. 
 # indicates that both GINI and INCOM are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented.  The two proxy variables for the size of the mature aged 
cohort used as instruments were  a) the ratio of the size of the cohort aged between 40 and 59 to the whole population, and b) the logarithm of the population 
aged between 50 and 59.  
 (1)ALL (2)ALL# (3)ALL (4)ALL# (5)YOUG (6)YOUG# (7)YOUG (8)YOUG# (9)OLD (10)OLD# (11)OLD (12)OLD# 
Ln(GINI) -2.37** 
(-2.61) 
-2.16* 
(-2.06) 
-2.36** 
(-2.63) 
-2.17* 
(-2.10) 
-2.58* 
(-2.03) 
-2.66* 
(-1.79) 
-2.42* 
(-1.95) 
-2.38* 
(-1.65) 
-2.06* 
(-1.80) 
-1.40 
(-1.05) 
-2.02* 
(-1.78) 
-1.14 
(-0.83) 
Ln(ETFRA) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.57) 
-0.03 
(-0.86) 
-0.02 
(-0.62) 
Ln(AGEFRA) -0.18 
(-0.05) 
-0.06 
(-0.02) 
0.59 
(0.15) 
0.70 
(0.18) 
0.49 
(0.09) 
0.44 
(0.08) 
1.05 
(0.19) 
1.08 
(0.20) 
-0.12 
(-0.24) 
-0.82 
(-0.16) 
-3.41 
(-0.67) 
-3.13 
(-0.59) 
Ln(GENSAM) 
 
  -0.12** 
(-3.17) 
-0.12** 
(-3.20) 
  -0.35** 
(-3.07) 
-0.35** 
(-3.05) 
  0.16* 
(1.93) 
0.18* 
(2.03) 
Ln(HC) 
 
-5.61** 
(-2.80) 
-4.48 
(-1.32) 
-5.63** 
(-2.84) 
-4.65 
(-1.39) 
-7.82** 
(-2.79) 
-8.23* 
(-1.71) 
-7.19** 
(-2.62) 
-6.98 
(-1.49) 
-2.29 
(-0.91) 
1.12 
(0.26) 
-1.79 
(-0.71) 
2.65 
(0.59) 
Ln(FFTM) 
 
0.31 
(1.21) 
0.27 
(0.94) 
0.31 
(1.22) 
0.27 
(0.97) 
0.22 
(0.61) 
0.24 
(0.60) 
0.24 
(0.70) 
0.24 
(0.61) 
0.46 
(1.39) 
0.31 
(0.85) 
0.48 
(1.48) 
0.29 
(0.79) 
Ln(FFME) 
 
0.20 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.47) 
0.21 
(0.47) 
0.21 
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.66) 
0.42 
(0.65) 
0.40 
(0.64) 
0.40 
(0.64) 
-0.11 
(-0.19) 
-0.09 
(-0.16) 
-0.12 
(-0.22) 
-0.11 
(-0.19) 
Ln(MOBIN) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
-0.07 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.22) 
-0.06 
(-0.36) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.05 
(-0.25) 
-0.15 
(-0.66) 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
-0.17 
(-0.70) 
Ln(MOBIM) 
 
0.12 
(0.70) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.69) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.26) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.27) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.22 
(0.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.23 
(1.04) 
-0.06 
(-0.19) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.30 
(0.80) 
0.37 
(0.90) 
0.30 
(0.80) 
0.36 
(0.89) 
0.18 
(0.35) 
0.16 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.37) 
0.49 
(1.01) 
0.70 
(1.32) 
0.51 
(1.04) 
0.78 
(1.45) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.37* 
(2.14) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.37* 
(2.16) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.47* 
(1.93) 
0.59 
(0.51) 
0.45* 
(1.91) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
0.22 
(1.03) 
-0.76 
(-0.73) 
0.22 
(1.08) 
-1.05 
(-0.98) 
Y1524 
 
-0.34** 
(-15.9) 
-0.34** 
(-16.1) 
-0.40** 
(-14.2) 
-0.40** 
(-14.4) 
-0.09** 
(-4.11) 
-0.09** 
(-4.08) 
-0.08** 
(-3.81) 
-0.08** 
(-3.82) 
    
Y2534 
 
-0.37** 
(-17.4) 
-0.37** 
(-17.6) 
-0.43** 
(-15.4) 
-0.43** 
(-15.5) 
-0.12** 
(-5.52) 
-0.12** 
(-5.49) 
-0.12** 
(-5.29) 
-0.12** 
(-5.30) 
    
Y3544 
 
-0.24** 
(-11.4) 
-0.24** 
(-11.5) 
-0.30** 
(-10.7) 
-0.30** 
(-10.8) 
        
Y4554 
 
-0.18** 
(-8.72) 
-0.18** 
(-8.81) 
-0.25** 
(-8.63) 
-0.25** 
(-8.71) 
    -0.18** 
(-10.9) 
-0.18** 
(-10.9) 
-0.10* 
(-2.28) 
-0.09* 
(-2.01) 
Obs 470 470 470 470 282 282 282 282 188 188 188 188 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
0.46 
0.79 
0.28 
0.56 
0.43 
0.78 
0.33 
0.56 
0.56 
0.75 
0.54 
0.46 
0.30 
0.85 
0.30 
0.58 
1.41 
0.49 
0.02 
0.87 
2.56 
0.27 
0.22 
0.63 
F-stat GINI 
      INCOM 
89.7 94.2 
1167 
84.5 88.2 
1096 
55.1 58.3 
724 
51.5 54.2 
674 
34.1 36.3 
452 
31.6 33.5 
416 
Adj. R 2 0.55 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.20 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.64 0.50 0.63 0.49 
